Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. 
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A few lines to acknowledge the people whose support made this thesis possible performance requirements with minimal modification. 1 The Army countered that the Air Force's objection was actually a veiled attempt to retain operational control of the air space and be recognized as the "executive agent" for medium and high-altitude UAS's across the entire Department of Defense (DoD). 2 After much debate, the JROC approved the Army's requirement for a new multi-purpose UAS despite vigorous opposition from the panel's Air
Force contingent.
Whatever the true motives behind the Sky Warrior dispute, it is apparent that there are major cultural differences between the US Army and US Air Force regarding the operation of UAS's. The Air Force operates UAS's through regional air component commanders, while the Army delegates operational control of UAS's to field commanders at various levels. 3 This provides Army commanders direct control of their battlespace awareness and targeting efforts, rather than reliance on a tasking and approval mechanism. Also, the Army uses trained enlisted personnel as UAS controllers while the Air Force uses rated pilots. 4 In the Army's opinion, having UAS controllers with field experience provides a much quicker and accurate assessment of the monitored area of operation. As a result, the complex acquisition process through which the DoD identifies, procures and implements advanced ISR systems is characterized by gaps in capabilities, growing competition for assets and systems that do not fully complement one another.
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While the symptoms and impacts of the ISR acquisition process are easy to identify, the exact causes are somewhat harder to determine. Without question the current process is rife with inefficiencies at virtually every level. Based upon the research outlined in this paper, the challenges facing the ISR acquisition community manifest themselves in three broad problem areas:
1. The DoD does not have a comprehensive vision or strategy for the ISR enterprise.
2. There is no unified ISR management mechanism to weigh the relative costs, benefits and risks of proposed investments.
3. The current ISR acquisition process promotes requirements definition by individual service components who may not have insight into enterprise-level priorities or viable alternatives to acquire the needed intelligence.
Scope and Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to assess and verify these three challenges facing the ISR acquisition community and to recommend changes to improve the integration of ISR capabilities across the DoD and national intelligence agencies. The objective is to advocate a joint DoD acquisition process that ensures future ISR investments reflect enterprise-level priorities and strategic goals, while providing a cost-effective baseline of advanced ISR tools, platforms and capabilities to support tactical operations. 
Part 3

Definitions
The ISR Enterprise ISR programs are procured and managed by one of two entities, the DoD or national intelligence agencies such as the CIA, NSA or NRO. For this discussion, the term "ISR enterprise" refers to all ISR programs managed by either entity, as well as the network infrastructure, applications and databases needed to collect, exploit and transmit intelligence information.
Requirements
The term "requirement" can have distinctly different meanings within the ISR enterprise.
A "mission requirement" is the actual intelligence or data that a user requires to achieve a specific objective. "Operational requirements" are the capabilities (i.e., systems and components) needed to collect that intelligence. 10 "Functional requirements" are the design constraints and minimal performance standards for the system or component being acquired.
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Unless stated otherwise, the requirements discussed in this research paper refer to the operational requirements submitted to obtain new ISR capabilities.
"Strategic" vs "Tactical" ISR
The ISR enterprise has undergone a radical transformation in recent years. What was once an industry focused primarily on strategic surveillance from space-based platforms has exploded into a multi-sensor enterprise of commercial satellites, manned reconnaissance systems, and UAS's. Despite the differing timelines and analysis cycle of strategic and tactical intelligence, the traditional distinction between the intelligence missions of DoD and the national intelligence community have become blurred. For example, imagery from national satellites can now be made immediately available to tactical users, while intelligence acquired at the tactical level is transmitted to national-level agencies. 13 In other words, the DoD is engaged in more strategic missions while the national intelligence community has engaged in more tactical missions. between the JCIDS and MRB, no standard process exists to determine which DoD proposals will be reviewed by the MRB, or what criteria will be used to conduct such reviews. 16 The lack of protocol in vetting coincident requirements often puts the DoD and DNI at odds. For example, in 2008 the JCIDS reviewed a CENTCOM requirement for increased surveillance capabilities and determined that the shortfall would be best met by increasing the number of UAS's available to CENTCOM's service components. The MRB determined the exact same requirement could be addressed by efficiency gains in other surveillance methods.
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Despite the DNI's willingness to support tactical missions with national assets, many DoD requirements sponsors are reluctant to consider national systems as an alternative. 18 There are a variety of reasons why the DoD insists on acquiring in-house ISR capabilities when national agencies offer a viable alternative. For one, no single source of information exists that specifies the capability and availability of national assets, and if there were, many in the DoD community lack the security clearance needed to even evaluate select national systems. 19 Trust and control is also an issue, as many within the DoD community are apprehensive about dependence on other system owners.
The DoD Defense Acquisition Structure
The DoD's defense acquisition structure consists of three interrelated systems that can be described in broad terms as requirements generation, resource allocation and acquisition management. As mentioned previously, the requirements component is known as the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS). Created in 2003, JCIDS is a DoDlevel collaborative process for identifying, assessing and prioritizing warfighter requirements.
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Resource allocation is determined through the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System (PPBES). The PPBES is the framework through which JCIDS-vetted requirements are evaluated relative to other DoD needs and budgeted in accordance with strategic guidance and fiscal constraints. 21 The third component of the DoD defense acquisition structure is the Defense Acquisition System (DAS). As the name implies, the DAS is the management process by which the DoD initiates and oversees the actual procurement of new technologies and programs. The complexity of this three-step process combined with the magnitude of personnel, activities and funding involved in its operation can result in problems such as inefficient operations, fraud/waste/abuse, redundancy, and inadequate enforcement of laws and regulations. It is important to note that requirements definition, submission and vetting is a "capabilities-based" process, meaning the COCOM or requirements originator submits the capability shortfall they wish to address along with the minimum performance criteria needed for the eventual solution. The actual material solution for the submitted requirement is determined by a Functional Solution Analysis (FSA). 28 The FSA is the final output of the JCIDS process. In a capabilities-based system, requirements originated by the COCOM or service components must be as descriptive and accurate as possible, and baseline performance criteria should be articulated in standard terms and common frames of reference.
How Approved ISR Requirements are Funded
For budgeting purposes, the various systems that collect, process and disseminate intelligence are grouped into two major categories of programs, the National Intelligence To further complicate the management and coordination of ISR programs, some elements within the DoD have turned to supplemental appropriations to obtain intelligence assets that they did not get through the established budget and planning process. 41 One such appropriation vehicle is the Defense Emergency Resource Fund (DERF), a funding initiative that allows the DoD to shift funds from a generic counterterrorism fund to specific sub-accounts. 42 Although the supplemental appropriation mechanism often results in a service obtaining a much needed capability, the practice undercuts the established budgeting and oversight process making it difficult to weigh trade-offs and adjust priorities. It also impedes long-term planning and has an erosive effect on efforts to consolidate resources.
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The total fiscal budget for ISR programs is difficult to assess due to the classified nature of programs, but the 2008 funding for the national intelligence systems alone exceeded 47 billion dollars. 44 With that type of massive expenditure, the need for operational efficiency and sound decision making is critical. Unfortunately, the current system provides little opportunity to compare costs or make efficiency trade-offs.
Part 5 Challenges for the ISR Acquisition Community
The unparalleled complexity of the DoD's defense acquisition structure lends itself to an abundance of problematic issues. 45 In general terms, the challenges facing the ISR acquisition community can be consolidated into three basic problem statements:
The DoD does not have a comprehensive vision or strategy for the ISR enterprise.
The lack of a clearly-defined, cohesive strategy to guide ISR investments has been a highly visible area of concern for many years. In 1995, the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence (SSCI) recommended a joint review by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)
and the Deputy Secretary of Defense to ensure both the DoD and intelligence community were being equally served in the planning, programming and management of intelligence activities.
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The 1997 Intelligence Authorization Act included provisions that strengthened the ability of the DCI to participate in budget development for defense-wide and tactical intelligence. 
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Released in 2005, the "ISR Roadmap" has provided a multitude of benefits to the DoD and intelligence community. First, it has provided a catalog of both existing and planned ISR systems to help guide investment decisions. It also outlined six specific strategic goals for the future ISR enterprise; converge DoD capabilities, attain persistent surveillance, achieve horizontal integration of intelligence information, achieve a collaborative net-centric distributed operations infrastructure, transform ISR management capabilities, and operationalize intelligence. 49 Although the ISR Roadmap defines strategic objectives in broad terms, it does not specify future ISR requirements, identify funding priorities, or define a vetting mechanism to ensure the service's ISR investments reflect the overall strategy. 50 In short, the DoD still lacks a clearly defined vision of the future ISR enterprise to guide its ISR investments. 2. There is no unified ISR management mechanism to weigh the relative costs, benefits and risks of proposed investments.
The JROC is the current enterprise-level entity for vetting requirements and addressing capability shortfalls across the DoD. The DoD agencies, COCOMs and services present their mission need statements to the JROC which evaluates each candidate requirement on a case-bycase basis. The JROC focus is on the service need and shortfall however, rather than the capabilities needed to fulfill the mission. 52 Neither the JROC nor its subpanels have the time or technical expertise to fully explore potential options for addressing the ISR capability shortfalls.
Also, there is no mechanism in place to identify options, capability gaps or duplication of effort.
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To provide decision-makers with a mechanism to compare and contrast service requirements, the DoD is compiling an inventory of functional activities known as the Joint Capability Areas (JCA). Initiated in 2005, the JCAs are a set of standardized definitions of DoD capabilities that are divided into manageable categories. 54 The intent of the JCAs is to establish a common doctrinal language to define needs, analyze gaps in capability, and identify areas where there may be an excess of capabilities. 55 The JCAs have provided a basic framework to evaluate competing service requirements on a comparable basis.
The JROC and the JCAs provide positive momentum towards managing ISR investments from a joint, enterprise-level perspective rather than from a single service point of view.
However, the DoD as a whole has not established the criteria and methods to identify the best return on investment in light of strategic goals.
The current ISR acquisition process promotes requirements definition by individual service components who may not have insight into enterprise-level priorities or viable options to acquire the needed intelligence.
Since the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1984, the armed forces have made extraordinary progress in moving toward a joint and seamless force. Yet this joint synergy has not extended into the areas of ISR acquisition and management. Joint entities such as the JROC review and validate funding priorities, but have little input into the definition of requirements. Nor does the JROC have any oversight of the budgeting process to ensure that JROC-validated requirements are adequately funded. 56 The services are ultimately responsible for justifying funding priorities before Congress, and maintain both ownership and budgetary control over the resulting ISR assets.
Service ownership of ISR assets presents a number of inherent challenges. First, service oriented planning does not consider the full range of solutions available to fulfill operational requirements. Requirements managers at the service level often lack knowledge about national systems and can even lack the security clearance needed to review and evaluate capability options using national assets. 57 Some process owners have had prior difficulty in tasking national satellites and have complained of poor quality imagery. 58 There is also reluctance on the part of some DoD requirements sponsors to consider national ISR systems as an alternative because they simply do not want to be dependent on another system owner. A third issue involving service oriented ISR planning can be loosely described as "unintended consequences." Many service level ISR assets began development without a longterm plan to manage and sustain their program. As a result, funding and resources are directed toward short-term needs or "gluing" ill-suited and disparate components together in an attempt to force jointness. Also, schedule delays in some programs have forced the services to make unplanned investments in legacy systems to keep them active longer than expected.
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Perhaps the best example of a troubled acquisition program's cascading effect on legacy systems is the US Air Force Global Hawk high-altitude UAS. At a cost of $10 million per copy, the Global Hawk was intended to provide cost-effective reconnaissance capabilities similar to the aging U2 manned platform. The Global Hawk provides an operational advantage over national satellite assets in that it can be tasked by local commanders and launched on demand. 62 Unfortunately, the initial acquisition program had significant shortcomings, as the platform proved to be underpowered and lacked a signals intelligence capability. 63 The Air Force has now funded a $75 million per copy upgrade of the initial Global Hawk that includes greater payload and a more robust signals collection capability, but the resulting schedule delay has forced the Air Force to maintain the U2 program far beyond its projected retirement.
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Part 6
Conclusion and Recommendations
The current DoD acquisition process discourages the consolidation and integration of capabilities across the ISR enterprise. Since requirements and budgets are defined based on stovepipe applications, ISR system developers are forced to integrate capabilities after the fact rather than design efficient and holistic systems from the start. Congress has recognized this deficiency and authorized several significant enhancements to the acquisition process. Congress, the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence would all need to be involved in any legislative activity that significantly modifies the ISR acquisition process, but less drastic modifications could also improve the integration and coordination issues that are at the heart of the ISR acquisition dilemma. The following recommendations outline four initiatives the DoD acquisition community could implement to mitigate shortfalls in the current ISR procurement environment. These suggestions are not without controversy, since implementation would inevitably require coordination, resource sharing and potential loss of decision authority by select DoD elements. The recommendations are not mutually dependent, however, and can be considered in aggregate to address portions of the ISR acquisition conundrum.
Define an overall Enterprise Architecture for ISR:
A critical shortfall in the current ISR acquisition environment is the absence of a comprehensive and clearly-defined enterprise architecture. Without a documented enterprise architecture model, the service's requirements managers are essentially making decisions based on their own personal perception of the ISR enterprise which is often not in alignment with the other service components or with the overall strategic direction of the DoD.
Within the DoD ISR community, a physical enterprise architecture for interoperability is provided by the Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS). The DCGS is a web-based global intelligence-sharing network that spans the military services and defense intelligence agencies. 65 Included in the DCGS model is a set of open interface standards known as the DCGS Integration Backbone (DIB). The DIB provides a common framework to ensure interoperability, data sharing and collaboration among all DCGS elements. 66 Although the DCGS outlines a conceptual framework to ensure new ISR capabilities can interact, it does not provide the holistic enterprise architecture in the systems engineering sense that is needed to assess requirements for new ISR capabilities and make sound investment decisions.
In the systems engineering discipline, an enterprise architecture is simply a documented model of an organizations current (as is) state, its target (to be) state, and a sequencing plan for moving between the two states. 67 In addition to a thorough inventory of strategic assets, an ISR enterprise architecture would define organizational components of the ISR enterprise and the interrelationships and interdependencies of those organizations. It would define the ISR mission of each component and document the information needed to achieve that mission. An enterprise architecture would also document a transition process for implementing new technologies in response to changing mission needs. The term "standards development" is generally applied to computer systems and network protocols. In actuality, all systems have structures that allow their components and subsystems to work together to achieve the required functionality. Adherence to a well documented set of baseline standards during the design phase of ISR systems development allows these structures to interact and results in substantial cost savings, interoperability and efficiency benefits over the life cycle of the program. Although the main goal of baseline standards is interoperability, a standards-based systems development approach also reduces development cycle times, encourages higher levels of performance, provides greater adaptability to evolving requirements, and lowers the risk of technology obsolescence.
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A second enhancement to the source selection phase of ISR system acquisition would be the creation of an approved vendor list for program development. The intent of an approved vendor registry is not to exclude specific commercial contractors, but to ensure that the systems engineering process meets performance expectations for quality, efficiency and timeliness.
Typically, a vendor registry is a living document that adds or excludes service providers based on prior performance, standards compliance and business relationships throughout their particular industry. A second option for a joint ISR requirements agent is Joint Forces Command (JFCOM).
Establish a Joint ISR Requirements Agent for the DoD:
Under this proposal, COCOMs and service components would be required to define requirements and compile mission need statements in conjunction with ISR subject matter experts at JFCOM. By channeling all new ISR requirements through JFCOM, the DoD would take advantage of JFCOM's established infrastructure for developing, evaluating and prioritizing interoperable systems. 76 As the existing DoD authority for joint concept and capabilities development, JFCOM would provide the USD(I) with a ready mechanism to ensure future ISR requirements are defined in accordance with enterprise-level priorities rather than servicespecific opinions.
Promote a common culture and common language across the ISR enterprise:
Perhaps the simplest, yet most perplexing, obstacle to establishing a joint, cohesive ISR acquisition process is the diversity of stove piped work cultures throughout the ISR enterprise.
The proliferation of ISR programs across the DoD and the inherent overlap between tactical and strategic ISR domains has caused a great deal of confusion in regards to the future ISR operational environment. The role of the US Air Force as the executive agent for medium and high altitude UAS's has yet to be defined, and even knowledgeable insiders are unlikely to appreciate all of the fine and arbitrary distinctions among the military and national programs.
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The DoD and the DNI need to work together to identify future ISR requirements, specify funding priorities and define clear lines of authority.
Traditionally, redundancies within the multitude of ISR programs have been extremely difficult to detect because categories, verbiage and system descriptions vary from one service to another. 78 The JCAs will help to provide the basic lexicon needed to compare and contrast programs, but the DoD still needs to establish business rules and metrics to evaluate and prioritize specific ISR programs. Also, requirements managers at the service level need to maintain the appropriate security clearance to review and evaluate capability options using national assets.
Another key to common culture is education. Exchange programs, joint exercises, collaborative working groups and formal educational programs are all ways to establish and enhance a common language and culture throughout the ISR enterprise. 
Conclusion
This paper provides a cursory overview of a DoD acquisition environment that struggles to coordinate, consolidate and manage the rapidly expanding ISR enterprise. It has reviewed the complex Defense Acquisition Structure, outlined the challenges facing the acquisition process, and recommended changes to improve the integration of new capabilities across the ISR community. None of these suggestions, however, are as important to the goal of an improved joint ISR acquisition process as leadership and the will to implement change. Both the DoD and the National Intelligence Community have a vested interest in securing a holistic acquisition process that ensures ISR investments reflect enterprise-level priorities. Together, they need to communicate their strategic goals for the acquisition and distribution of ISR resources, clearly map out a plan to achieve these goals and hold people accountable for meeting them. These are essential ingredients to implementing change and taking full advantage of new and incredibly advanced ISR capabilities. 
